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The Role of Taxes in the Disconnect between Corporate Performance 
and Economic Growth 
Abstract 
We investigate the relation between the growth in corporate profits and the overall U.S. economy, 
focusing on the impact of the U.S. corporate tax regime on this relation. We document that the 
growth of corporate profits, on average, has outpaced the growth of the economy and this 
disconnect increases as the difference between the corporate income tax rate of the U.S. and the 
other OECD countries increases. The underlying mechanism is fewer corporate profits being 
channeled into subsequent domestic investments when the U.S. tax rate is relatively higher, leading 
to lower economic growth. Our findings have implications for policy setters. 
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1. Introduction 
Without frictions, growth in corporate profits should be closely related to growth in the 
economy.1 However, in the presence of frictions, such as different corporate tax rates across 
jurisdictions, this relation may be altered or eliminated altogether. For example, during 2013, U.S. 
corporations earned $2.1 trillion dollars in pre-tax profits — the highest level in at least 85 years 
— resulting in a 6% increase from the previous year (Norris 2014). In contrast, the U.S. economy 
grew by only 2% in the same period. In fact, for nearly a quarter century, corporate profits in the 
United States have grown at a faster rate than Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
In this paper, we investigate the relation between the performance of corporations and the 
overall economy with a focus on the impact of the U.S. corporate tax regime on this relation. Using 
a shock to the tax system, and cross-country, time-series, and cross-sectional analyses, we 
document that the relatively higher U.S. corporate tax rate — in relation to the average rate of the 
other countries in the OECD — combined with the tax treatment of foreign earnings of U.S. 
corporations have contributed to corporate profit growth not translating into subsequent overall 
economic growth. As a result, on average, the growth of corporate profits has outpaced the growth 
of the overall economy. While this disconnect between corporate profit growth and economic 
growth has received occasional coverage in the popular press (e.g., The Economist 2014), we 
provide a systematic and thorough examination of the issue and show the impact of the U.S. tax 
regime on the relation between the performance of U.S. corporations and overall economic growth 
in the United States. 
																																								 																				
1 Corporate profits represent the portion of total income earned from current production that is accounted for by U.S. 
corporations, public and private. In our analyses, we use domestic and national corporate profits estimates prepared 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which are the measures used to calculate gross domestic income (i.e., 
the income equivalent of gross domestic product).  
2 
 
The unique corporate tax regime in the United States is a potentially important factor that 
can result in a disconnect between the growth of corporate profits and that of the economy. In 
deciding whether to invest in a project, managers compare the marginal benefits of the investment 
to its marginal costs. Taxes influence these investment decisions because they affect the costs of 
investments and a project’s net present value (Hall and Jorgensen 1967; Romer and Romer 2010).  
Tax policy can affect allocation of capital, as well as the shifting of income to lower tax 
jurisdictions (Hines 1997; Grubert and Mutti 1991; De Mooij and Ederveen 2003; Klassen and 
Laplante 2012). Therefore, if the corporate income tax rate in the United States is relatively higher 
than that in other countries, firms have incentives to reduce the after-tax costs of investments by 
diverting investments to jurisdictions with lower corporate taxes. This decision can result in 
corporate profits not translating into subsequent domestic investments, which can contribute to the 
disconnect between corporate performance and economic growth.  
Additionally, the tax treatment of foreign profits of U.S. multinationals provides an 
incentive for these firms to invest abroad. Under U.S. tax law, multinational firms must pay taxes 
on foreign profits at a rate equal to the U.S. tax rate upon repatriation of the earnings to the United 
States, and they receive a credit for foreign taxes paid on those earnings. For financial reporting 
purposes, under U.S. GAAP a deferred tax liability is recognized because of the temporary 
difference created under this regime. However, a multinational firm can designate the foreign 
earnings to be “permanently reinvested” under APB Opinion No. 23 to defer recognizing the 
residual U.S. tax.2 Thus, the corporate tax regime in the United States is incentivizing firms to 
																																								 																				
2 Permanently reinvested earnings are earnings from foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms that have been 
invested abroad and that managers intend to reinvest indefinitely or that managers intend to remit in a tax-free 
liquidation (Oler, Shevlin, and Wilson 2007). Following FASB Accounting Standards Codification, APB 23 is 
included in Topic 740-10-25. 
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invest these profits abroad or hold them as cash.3 This incentive, in turn, could contribute to the 
disconnect between U.S. corporate performance and economic growth. 
In contrast, U.S. corporations can take advantage of relatively lower tax rates abroad to 
maximize shareholder wealth, resulting in wealth effects for their shareholders. These wealth 
effects can impact components of economic growth (e.g., consumption), resulting in higher growth 
of the overall economy (Poterba 2000). Consistent with wealth effects contributing to economic 
growth, we find that during our sample period aggregate stock returns and aggregate dividends 
(which take into account share repurchases and equity issuances) are associated with one quarter-
ahead consumption and overall economic growth. Hence, the negative investment effect on 
economic output could be offset by the positive consumption effect. Moreover, it is not obvious 
whether the effect of relatively higher U.S. taxes on domestic investments is large enough to have 
macroeconomic consequences (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Therefore, whether the U.S. tax 
regime can impact the relation between growth in corporate profits and overall economic growth 
is an empirical question. We test this question by exploiting variations in the U.S. corporate income 
tax rate relative to other countries over time.  
We conduct our empirical analyses during the period from 1975:Q1 to 2013:Q4 using 
aggregated quarterly data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Growth in corporate 
profits, on average, is higher than economic growth during our sample period. Specifically, the 
quarterly growth rate of national corporate profits is 2.28% compared to 1.53% for Gross National 
Product (GNP). However, the relation between corporate profit growth and economic growth in 
the United States depends on the U.S. corporate income tax rate relative to that of the other OECD 
																																								 																				
3 Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010) reports in a survey of tax executives that 48% of respondents of publicly traded 
firms with foreign earnings consider the accounting deferral of tax on foreign earnings allowed under APB 23 to be 
an important factor in the decision to invest abroad.  
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countries.4 We find that as the difference between the U.S. tax rate and the average tax rate of the 
OECD countries increases, the difference between the growth in corporate profits and the overall 
economy also increases. When the difference between the U.S. tax rate and the average OECD 
rate is below its time-series median, the growth in corporate profits exceeds that of the overall 
economy, on average, by 0.50% each quarter. Whereas, the difference between the growth rates 
of corporate profits and the economy increases, on average, to 0.99% each quarter when the 
difference between the U.S. tax rate and the average OECD rate is above its time-series median. 
The widening of the difference in the growth rates is economically significant as the average 
quarterly growth rates of national corporate profits and GNP are 2.28% and 1.53%, respectively, 
during our sample period. This result is robust whether using domestic corporate profits or national 
corporate profits, which adds foreign earnings of domestic firms to domestic corporate profits. 
To better understand the disconnect between corporate performance and economic growth, 
we examine the relation between corporate profit growth and growth in quarter-ahead domestic 
investments. We find that as the difference between the U.S. tax rate and the average tax rate of 
the OECD countries increases, fewer corporate profits are converted into subsequent domestic 
investments. During the period when the difference between the U.S. tax rate and the average 
OECD rate is below (above) its time-series median, a 1% increase in corporate profits is associated 
with a 0.24% (0.03%) increase in one-quarter ahead domestic investments. The same pattern is 
observed in total repatriations of foreign earnings made by U.S. multinationals: As the difference 
between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average rate of OECD countries rises, repatriations by 
																																								 																				
4 Our analyses are based on the comparison of the U.S. statutory tax rate to the average OECD statutory tax rates. It 
is a possibility that the tax burden on corporations has not changed despite the changes in the statutory tax rates as the 
tax burden also depends on the tax base. That is, if the OECD countries broadened their tax bases, then comparing 
statutory tax rates in the United States to those of the OECD countries can lead to misleading inferences. However, 
Gropp and Kostial (2000) reports that the developments in effective tax rates in the OECD countries mirror those of 
statutory rates.  
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U.S. firms fall. The repatriations by U.S. multinational firms are lower by 16% when the difference 
between the U.S. tax rate and the average OECD rate is above its time-series median.   
Next, we use the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) as a shock to establish the 
effect of variations in the U.S. tax rate on the relation between growth in corporate profits and the 
economy. The AJCA temporarily lowered U.S. multinationals’ tax cost of repatriating foreign 
earnings from 35% to 5.25%. Identifying the effects of tax changes on corporate behavior and the 
overall economy can be a significant challenge because factors that give rise to tax changes are 
also correlated with economic output and the performance of corporations (e.g., Hassett and 
Hubbard 2002; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), but, using the narrative record of the history 
motivating the AJCA, Romer and Romer (2010) concludes that the shock of the AJCA is rather 
exogenous to other macroeconomic factors affecting economic output and corporate performance. 
Prior literature has found mixed evidence on the relation between the AJCA and firm-level 
investment decisions.5 The advantage of examining the AJCA at the macroeconomic level is that, 
if companies repatriate earnings, these funds will flow into the economy irrespective of whether 
firms make investments domestically or distribute them to investors. This allows us to examine 
the effect of the AJCA on overall economic activity. We find that contemporaneous aggregate 
repatriations, one-quarter-ahead aggregate domestic investment growth, aggregate personal 
consumption growth, and economic growth increased significantly during the quarters when the 
																																								 																				
5 Blouin and Krull (2009) finds that firms that chose to repatriate had limited domestic investment opportunities and 
that dividends and repurchases by these firms increased significantly during the act. Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes 
(2011) reports that repatriations did not increase domestic investment, employment, or R&D; instead they were 
associated with an increase in shareholder payouts. Faulkender and Petersen (2012) divides repatriating firms based 
on capital constraints and finds that only capital constrained U.S. multinationals took advantage of the AJCA to finance 
domestic investments using repatriated foreign earnings. Blouin, Krull, and Schwab (2014) reports that a small subset 
of U.S. firms receiving an incremental benefit from the domestic production activities deduction reduced shareholder 
payouts. Using the AJCA as a shock to firm-level investment opportunities on multinational companies, Edwards, 
Kravet, and Wilson (2015) finds that the AJCA reduced the effect of suboptimal investment by firms with cash 
“trapped” abroad. 
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AJCA reduced the tax cost of repatriating foreign earnings. On average, the AJCA resulted in 
increases of 58% in repatriations, 2% in one-quarter-ahead domestic investments, 0.39% in one-
quarter-ahead aggregate personal consumption growth, and 0.67% in one-quarter-ahead GDP. 
This evidence suggests that a reduction in the relative U.S. tax rate via the AJCA contributed to 
overall economic growth, and that tax rates affect the decision to repatriate foreign earnings and 
invest domestically, factors that have contributed to the disconnect between corporate profit 
growth and economic growth.  
To provide additional support for our findings, we conduct two more tests. First, we 
compare the relation between corporate profits and economic growth in the United States to this 
relation in Japan and the United Kingdom. While these three developed economies are arguably 
similar, they have starkly different tax structures. Japan’s corporate tax rate has been higher than 
the OECD average and higher than the U.S. rate for most of the last 20 years.  Alternatively, the 
corporate tax rate in the United Kingdom has been much lower than that in the United States and 
has very closely followed the decline in the rate of the other OECD countries. If higher tax rates 
contribute to the disconnect between corporate profits and economic growth, then we should also 
observe a similar disconnect for Japan but not for the United Kingdom.6 The evidence is consistent 
with these conjectures.  
Second, we compare the changes in financial asset holdings of industries considered 
“mobile” for tax purposes (De Simone and Stromberg 2013) to other industries.7 We conjecture 
that to the extent firms in mobile industries have limited investment opportunities abroad, we 
																																								 																				
6 Both Japan and United Kingdom have changed their treatment of earnings made abroad by domestic companies. In 
2009 (2010), Japan (the United Kingdom) moved from a worldwide taxation system to a territorial system. We find 
that in both countries, domestic investment growth increases after the change, suggesting that companies are investing 
more of their profits domestically after the tax system changes from a worldwide tax system to a territorial one.  
7 Firms in mobile industries are able to transfer profits to low jurisdictions to reduce their tax burden, but they cannot 
repatriate these profits to either make domestic investments or distribute dividends to shareholders without incurring 
tax on the repatriated earnings.  
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should observe a significantly larger increase in financial asset holdings (cash and short-term 
marketable securities) of firms in these industries when the U.S. tax rate is higher than the OECD 
tax rate. We find evidence consistent with our prediction.  
It is important to note that we do not claim that relatively higher U.S. corporate tax rates 
are the only reason for the disconnect between the growth in corporate profits and the growth in 
the overall economy. In a global economy, corporations will structure their operations to exploit 
opportunities to grow and create value around the world. Hence, in our multivariate tests, we 
control for numerous macroeconomic factors that could influence the relation between corporate 
profits and the overall U.S. economy.8 Further, we triangulate our evidence by employing a variety 
of tests that take advantage of a tax shock, and cross-sectional and cross-country differences. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that the U.S. tax regime is one crucial factor contributing to the 
observed disconnect between the growth rate of corporate profits and that of the U.S. economy.  
We make several contributions to the literature by providing evidence of the impact of 
cross-country differences in tax policies on the relation between corporate profits and the 
macroeconomy. First, while prior studies document the effect of taxes on investments, the 
evidence does not allow one to conclude whether the effect of relatively higher U.S. taxes on firm-
level domestic investments is large and systematic enough to have macroeconomic consequences 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Further, wealth effects at the aggregate level can offset the negative 
effects of lower investments on overall economic growth.  We systematically document that the 
U.S. tax regime has implications for the relation between corporate profits and overall economic 
																																								 																				
8 The factors that we control for include globalization, technological innovations, productivity changes, currency 
fluctuations, foreign investment opportunities, the corporate environment, interest rates, recessions, the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, and income inequality in the United States.  
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growth. We show that fewer corporate profits translate into subsequent economic growth when the 
U.S. corporate income tax rate is higher relative to the average of the other OECD countries.  
Second, we build on the literature that has examined the economic consequences of the 
AJCA by documenting the effect of the AJCA at the macroeconomic level. Firm-level endogeneity 
has led to conflicting conclusions about the impact of the AJCA on the U.S. economy since the 
decision to repatriate and reinvest is correlated with many variables at the firm level (Faulkender 
and Petersen 2012), and to date there is little evidence suggesting that provisions in the AJCA 
spurred domestic investment (Blouin et al. 2014). By examining this shock in the aggregate, we 
are able to avoid the endogenous firm characteristics that have led to conflicting results in the 
literature. We show that the AJCA resulted in an increase in subsequent aggregate domestic 
investments, aggregate personal consumption growth, and U.S. economic growth.  
Finally, we contribute to the debate over the costs and benefits of a territorial versus 
worldwide tax system. Using data from Japan, we document that a change from a worldwide tax 
system to a territorial tax system is associated with an increase in the amount of corporate profits 
translating into subsequent domestic investments. Currently, the United States is deliberating 
reforming its tax code. We provide direct evidence to evaluate the expected consequences of 
decreases in the corporate tax rate and changes from a worldwide tax system to a territorial one on 
domestic investment and economic growth.    
2. Taxes, corporate profits, and economic growth 
Several prior studies have examined the relation between taxes and economic growth. 
However, the empirical evidence of the effect of taxes on economic growth is, at best, mixed (e.g., 
Huang and Frentz 2014). Arnold et al. (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) document that higher 
corporate taxes are associated with lower economic growth, whereas other studies find that tax 
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policy is an ineffective tool to spur economic growth (e.g., Mendoza et al. 1997; Agell et al. 2003).9 
We extend this literature by investigating how taxes in general and the relative U.S. tax rate in 
particular impact the relation between corporate profits and future economic growth.       
A clear theoretical relation exists between taxes and investment decisions. Investments will be 
made only when the marginal benefit of the investment exceeds the marginal cost, and taxes impact 
the amount and uncertainty of this net present value calculation. Hall and Jorgenson (1967) shows 
that taxes increase the cost of investment, reducing the likelihood of investing, while tax credits 
have the opposite effect. Slemrod (1992) argues that firms respond to taxation through the timing 
of their economic transactions, accounting alterations, and real decisions. 
Despite this theoretical connection, economists have struggled to document a link between 
tax changes and investment in the aggregate, what Hines (1998) called “one of the major puzzles 
in the empirical investment literature.” Hassett and Hubbard (2002) suggests that endogeneity 
makes it difficult to isolate the effects of taxes on investment using time-series data since several 
aggregate variables move together over the business cycle. In summarizing this issue, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) states that it is likely that a change in tax rates is in response to other 
macroeconomic factors that could also impact investments. In addition, the authors argue, 
controlling for the effect of contemporaneous non-tax shocks on investments poses other 
challenges, and it is difficult to completely rule out their effects. In the cross section, on the other 
hand, some empirical studies (Hassett and Hubbard 2002; Hassett and Newmark 2008) find the 
expected negative relation between investments and taxes, but drawing macroeconomic inferences 
from these studies is difficult (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
																																								 																				
9 A recent interesting study by Shevlin, Shivakumar and Urcan (2016) investigates the effect of tax avoidance on 
future economic growth. 
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To mitigate the effects of these confounding factors, Romer and Romer (2010) uses a 
unique strategy to isolate the effects of tax changes on macroeconomic variables. The study 
examines the narrative record of tax changes and separates the reasons for these changes into four 
categories: (1) offsetting a shift in government spending; (2) offsetting another factor affecting 
output in the near future; (3) addressing an inherited budget deficit; and (4) achieving long-run 
goals like higher growth or increased fairness. Categories (1) and (2) are correlated with other 
developments affecting output, and therefore cannot be used to estimate the effects of tax changes 
on output, but categories (3) and (4), according to the authors, are unlikely to be systematically 
related to other factors impacting output in the short and medium run. Romer and Romer (2010) 
uses tax changes that fall into the latter two categories as fiscal shocks and shows that tax increases 
have a large negative effect on investment, while tax cuts have positive and persistent investment 
effects. 
Given that tax policy directly affects the net returns from investments, investment location 
decisions are strongly influenced by differences in tax costs across countries.10 Studies have 
documented that the average tax elasticity of investment is negative, suggesting that an increase in 
host countries’ tax rates results in a decrease in U.S. foreign direct investment in that jurisdiction 
(Grubert and Mutti 1991; Hines and Rice 1994).11 Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2000) reports 
that investment location decisions have become more sensitive to tax rates over time and finds that 
																																								 																				
10 Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) finds that, on average, U.S. firms with operations in tax havens have lower tax bills. 
When examining Delaware, a domestic tax haven, Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock (2013) provides evidence that 
taxes affect the decision to locate subsidiaries in the state, and parent firms that do locate their subsidiaries there 
receive substantial tax savings. 
11 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a review of a related literature that examines global tax planning by U.S. 
multinationals with regard to capital structure. Maydew (2001) provides a discussion of Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001). 
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the elasticity of real capital to after-tax returns of large U.S. manufacturing multinational 
companies increased from 1.5 in 1984 to 2.8 in 1992. 
Further, the tax treatment of foreign income provides firms with discretion over the timing 
of reporting taxable income and/or book income (Krull 2004; Shackleford, Slemrod, and Sallee 
2011). Thus, firms that value flexibility in tax and financial reporting have incentives to invest 
outside the United States (Shackelford, Shaviro, and Slemrod 2010). The tax rules do not require 
U.S. parent companies to pay any U.S. taxes on the earnings of their foreign subsidiaries until the 
profits are repatriated to the United States as dividends.12 U.S. GAAP requires that a deferred tax 
liability be recognized because a temporary difference is created since foreign earnings will only 
be taxed when they are repatriated. However, a multinational firm can designate the foreign 
earnings to be permanently reinvested under APB 23 to defer recognizing the residual U.S. tax. 
By electing to designate foreign income as permanently reinvested, the U.S. parent company can 
reduce its income tax expense and report higher after-tax earnings for the current year if the tax 
rate in the host country of the foreign subsidiary is lower than that in the United States. This 
increase in earnings is a result of the recognized tax expense being made up only of the foreign 
taxes paid at the lower foreign income tax rate.  
Accounting deferral of taxes on foreign earnings allowed under APB 23 has also proved to 
be an important factor in the decision to make investments abroad rather than in the United States. 
Several studies provide firm-level evidence showing that the tax treatment of foreign earnings 
encourages firms to invest abroad and hold more cash and financial assets (Hartman 1985; Foley, 
Hartzell, Titman, and Twite 2007; Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin 2010; Blouin, Krull, and 
Robinson 2012; Klassen and Laplante 2012; Blouin, Krull, and Robinson 2014; Klassen, Laplante, 
																																								 																				
12 When the foreign earnings are repatriated as dividends, the parent companies pay the “residual” U.S. tax, which is 
the U.S. tax due net of foreign tax credits for taxes paid to foreign governments.  
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and Carnaghan 2014).13 “Trapped cash,” as cash held abroad for tax reasons is often called, impacts 
investing decisions both at home and abroad. Hanlon et al. (2015) finds that trapped cash is 
positively related to increased foreign acquisitions, and that the market reaction to these 
acquisitions is negatively associated with the level of trapped cash. Relatedly, Edwards et al. 
(2015) finds a negative relation between the profitability of foreign acquisitions and the amount of 
trapped cash. The AJCA, which the authors use as a shock to this relation, significantly reduces 
this effect by allowing firms to repatriate foreign earnings held as cash abroad at a much lower tax 
cost. Finally, Blouin et al. (2014) explores the impact of trapped cash on domestic investment. In 
addition to providing evidence that most permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) abroad are held 
in financial assets, the study finds a negative relation between the ability of multinational firms to 
take advantage of domestic investment opportunities and the level of PRE held in cash by these 
firms.  
In summary, the direct effect of taxes on the after-tax return from investments and the tax 
treatment of foreign earnings provide incentives to U.S. companies to invest in jurisdictions 
outside the United States and discourages firms from repatriating foreign profits when the tax costs 
in the United States are relatively higher. Hence, when the United States is at a disadvantage 
relative to other jurisdictions due to a higher U.S. corporate tax rate, fewer corporate profits are 
likely to be channeled to subsequent domestic investments since companies have incentives to 
invest outside the United States and not repatriate foreign earnings. As a result, the relation 
																																								 																				
13 Klassen and LaPlante (2012) shows that, along with the differences in tax rates between jurisdictions, regulatory 
costs of income shifting also affect a firm’s decision to shift income between jurisdictions. They find that U.S. 
corporations have become more active recently at shifting income outside of the United States as regulatory costs of 
shifting have changed.  
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between corporate profits and economic growth may shift as lower growth in domestic investments 
results in lower contemporaneous growth in the economy. 
Alternatively, there are several reasons that can counteract the influence of the investment 
channel described above on the relation between corporate profits and economic growth. First, 
while prior studies provide firm-level evidence that relatively higher U.S. taxes and the tax 
treatment of foreign earnings have incentivized domestic firms to invest abroad or hold earnings 
outside the United States, these effects may not be large enough to have macroeconomic 
consequences, or they may be diversified when aggregated to the macroeconomic level such that 
the relatively higher U.S. taxes have not altered the relation between the growth in corporate profits 
and economic growth. For instance, Faulkender and Petersen (2012) reports that how a firm used 
the funds repatriated under the AJCA depended on whether the repatriating firm was financially 
constrained. Financially constrained firms, which were responsible for only 27% of the total funds 
repatriated under AJCA, used 78% of the funds they repatriated to increase investments. On the 
other hand, unconstrained firm, which accounted for a significant majority of the total funds 
repatriated under AJCA, did not use the repatriated funds for investments. Hence, it is unclear 
whether a reduction in repatriation taxes under AJCA had a large enough effect on aggregate 
investments at the macroeconomic level. By conducting our analyses at the aggregate 
macroeconomic level, we are able to avoid firm-level endogeneity and assess the macroeconomic 
impact of tax policy.   
Second, U.S. corporations can maximize shareholder wealth by taking advantage of 
relatively lower taxes abroad, resulting in wealth effects for their shareholders in the United States. 
Prior studies show that wealth effects can alter consumption (see Poterba (2000) for a review of 
this literature), which can contribute to overall economic growth. Poterba (2000) argues that, in 
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the United States, a 3% marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is reasonable. However, 
even such low estimates of the marginal propensity to consume can have significant aggregate 
consumption and demand effects: A 3% marginal propensity to consume out of stock market 
wealth accumulation during 1995-1999 is associated with an increase in aggregate demand of 
roughly 2% of GDP in 2000. Consistent with the wealth effects channel, we find that during our 
sample period aggregate stock returns and dividends are significantly associated with one-quarter 
ahead personal consumption and overall economic growth (as documented in Table A4). 
Therefore, whether and how the U.S. tax regime impacts the relation between growth of profits of 
U.S. corporations and economic growth is an empirical question as the investment and the wealth 
channels have offsetting effects on overall economic output.  
3. Sample and empirical analysis 
3.1. Sample 
The sample for our primary analyses consists of quarterly aggregated macroeconomic data 
from 1975 to 2013 obtained from the BEA. We use two measures of economic growth, GDP and 
GNP, and two measures of corporate profits, domestic corporate profits and national corporate 
profits. GDP is the value of all goods and services produced in the United States, while GNP is the 
value of all goods and services produced by U.S. residents and firms, regardless of where they are 
produced. Corporate profits, as defined by the BEA, are measures of the income of all corporations 
that are required to file corporate tax returns (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014). Domestic 
corporate profits include profits made within the United States, while national corporate profits 
include domestic and foreign profits of U.S. companies. Thus, national corporate profits include 
foreign profits of U.S. companies. Whereas, domestic corporate profits exclude profits made 
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abroad by domestic companies. Both national and domestic corporate profits are adjusted for 
changes in the book value of inventory and capital. These adjustments allow for a more direct 
examination of changes in actual profits without the influence of book changes in assets held on 
the balance sheet.14  
Using the BEA data rather than COMPUSTAT to measure corporate profits has several 
advantages. The BEA data allow us to include profits earned by public as well as private U.S. 
firms in our analysis. Further, using the BEA data ensures that our analysis of corporate profits 
and overall economic growth is not confounded by differences in measurement methodologies. 
That is, using BEA estimates ensures that corporate profits and economic output are measured in 
a consistent fashion. In contrast, aggregating firm-level profits as reported under U.S. GAAP can 
be problematic for our analysis because the definition and measurement methodology of corporate 
profits (which are also a component of total economic output) differs between the BEA and U.S. 
GAAP. Moreover, employing aggregate data is important since firm-level data cannot be used to 
reliably answer our research question because multiple channels (e.g., firms’ direct investments, 
changes in consumption) affect the relation between corporate profits and economic growth. 
Finally, firm-level corporate profits estimated using U.S. GAAP include profits earned 
domestically and in international jurisdictions. Whereas, the BEA data allows us to analyze the 
relation between domestic (national) corporate profits and domestic (national) economic growth 
separately.  
																																								 																				
14 The inventory adjustment removes gains or losses from holding inventory that is valued at historical cost. To do 
this, the BEA converts the valuation of withdrawals from inventory based on current and historical costs to a current-
cost basis. The capital adjustment first converts depreciation values to values based on useful lives and empirically 
based depreciation patterns. Then, it converts depreciation measures to current-cost values like in the inventory 
adjustment. 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP) and components of these 
variables (corporate profits, gross private domestic investment, government spending, employee 
compensation, and consumption) are quarter-over-quarter seasonally adjusted percent changes. A 
detailed description of all the variables is provided in the Appendix. We also collect data on the 
percentage of foreign earnings of U.S. firms that are repatriated through dividends and 
withdrawals, and those that are reinvested abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Quarterly data on repatriations from the BEA is available from 1981.  
We gather the quarterly yields on 10-year and 1-year Treasuries from CRSP. Quarterly 
value-weighted aggregate stock returns are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.15 We 
follow the National Bureau of Economic Research in defining recession periods. Tax rate data on 
OECD countries are retrieved from the OECD website from 1981 onwards. Prior to 1981, these 
data are collected from the Price Waterhouse & Co. Taxes in 80 Countries publications for the 
years 1975 to 1980. GDP data on OECD countries are also retrieved from the OECD website. Our 
measure of inequality, the percentage of total income earned by the wealthiest 1% of U.S. citizens, 
is retrieved from The World Top Income Database. Quarterly output per hour for all non-farm 
businesses, our measure of productivity, is retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Accounting data come from the Compustat quarterly dataset. Quarterly default spread, measured 
as the difference between the yields on Aaa and Baa corporate bonds, and the weighted average of 
the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against a subset of currencies that circulate widely 
are retrieved from FRED, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Finally, the sample for our main 
analyses is restricted to the period 1975:Q1 to 2013:Q4 because of tax data availability.  
 
																																								 																				
15 French’s data are available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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3.2. Growth in corporate profits and the economy  
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics  
We begin our analyses by examining the relation between the growth in corporate profits 
and growth in the economy. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 Panel A examine 
average quarterly growth in various macroeconomic variables during several periods. The average 
quarterly growth rate of GNP (GDP) is 1.53% (1.54%) over the full sample period compared to 
2.28% (2.46%) for national (domestic) corporate profits, which suggests a disconnect between 
corporate profit growth and economic growth in our sample period. 
The descriptive statistics provide evidence that the difference in the growth rates of 
corporate profits and the overall economy is greater when the difference between the tax rates of 
the United States and OECD is above the median difference (see Figure 1 for a plot of the corporate 
tax rate of the United States and the average corporate tax rate for the OECD countries during our 
sample period). When the difference between the tax rate in the United States and the average 
OECD tax rate is less than the median difference (2.60%), national (domestic) corporate profits, 
CPN (CPD), grow, on average, by 2.47% (2.67%) each quarter and GNP and GDP average growth 
is 1.97%. During the period in which the difference between the U.S. tax rate and that of the OECD 
average is above the median difference, corporate profits growth diverges more from growth in 
the overall economy: CPN (CPD) grows at an average rate of 2.11% (2.26%) each quarter, whereas 
the GNP (GDP) average growth rate is 1.12% (1.12%).16 The same pattern is observed in the 
relation between corporate profit growth and the growth of domestic investments (INV). When the 
																																								 																				
16 In untabulated results, we find that when the U.S. tax rate is below the average OECD tax rate, overall economic 
growth is higher than corporate profits growth. Specifically, in our sample period, we find that in 32 quarters, the U.S. 
tax rate is below the average OECD tax rate. In these quarters, growth in national (domestic) corporate profits is 1.37 
% (1.33%) which is lower than the GNP and GDP growth rates of 1.73%. 
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difference in the tax rates is below the median, the growth in CPN and INV are more closely 
aligned — 2.47% per quarter for CPN versus 1.98% for INV. These growth rates diverge 
significantly when the difference in the tax rates is above the median and the after-tax return on 
investments abroad exceeds that of investments in the United States. During the period when the 
difference in the tax rates is above the median difference, INV grows at only 1.15% per quarter, 
whereas CPN grows on average by 2.11% each quarter.  
In Panel B, we estimate multivariate regressions where we regress the growth in domestic 
corporate profits (CPD), the value of the U.S. tax rate minus the average OECD rate (Tax_diff), 
and the interaction of the two on the growth in the components of GDP. We find that only the 
growth in domestic investments (INV) has a significant and positive relation with CPD (Column 
(1) reports a coefficient of 0.11 on CPD, which is significant at the 5% level, and Column (2) 
reports a coefficient of 0.23 on CPD, which is significant at the 1% level). INV also is the only 
component of GDP that has a significant relation with the interaction of CPD and Tax_diff, with 
a coefficient of -1.70, significant at greater than 1% (see Column (2)). Given that we fail to find 
any empirical relations between the growth in other components of GDP and the growth in 
corporate profits, going forward we focus on domestic investments in our main analysis.   
Overall, Table 1 provides preliminary evidence in support of the claim that the relatively 
higher U.S. tax rate has contributed to the disconnect between the growth in corporate profits and 
growth in the overall economy by decreasing the after-tax return on domestic investments, 
resulting in fewer corporate profits being translated into domestic investments.  
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3.2.2. Multivariate analysis 
Next, using multivariate regressions, we examine the relation between corporate profits 
and economic growth, as well as the impact of tax rates on this relation. To do so, we investigate 
the association between the growth in domestic, as well as national corporate profits, and GDP and 
GNP.17 Through the examination of the association between overall economic growth and 
corporate profits growth, we attempt to capture whether the relatively higher U.S. tax rate affects 
the contribution of corporate profits to overall economic growth.  
Specifically, we estimate regressions nested in the following models:  
GNPt+1 = α + β1CPNt + β2Tax_difft + β3Tax_difft*CPNt + β4Crisist + β5GNPt + β6Termt + β7DEFt 
+ β8T-notet + β9Rett + β10Recessiont + β11Opennesst + β12Techt + β13Productivityt + β14FXt + 
β15Inv_oppt + β16Ineqt + εt+1        (1), 
GDPt+1 = α + γ1CPDt + γ2Tax_difft + γ3Tax_difft*CPDt + γ4Crisist + γ5GDPt + γ6Termt + γ7DEFt 
+ γ8T-notet + γ9Rett + γ10Recessiont + γ11Opennesst + γ12Techt + γ13Productivityt + γ14FXt + 
γ15Inv_oppt + γ16Ineqt + εt+1                                                                                                  (2),  
where GDP (GNP) is the quarterly percentage change in gross domestic (national) product. CPD 
(CPN) is the quarterly growth rate in domestic (national) corporate profits. Tax_diff is the 
difference between the statutory U.S. corporate income tax rate and the average statutory corporate 
income tax rate of the OECD countries. The interaction between Tax_diff and CPD (CPN) is our 
variable of interest. 
We do not claim that the differential tax rates are the only factor impacting the relation between 
corporate profits and economic growth. Hence, we include several variables to control for other 
																																								 																				
17 When examining corporate profits, we conduct our tests using both domestic and national corporate profits to 
provide robust evidence for our predictions. While the shifting relation between domestic corporate profits and 
economic growth is less direct in our setting, when taxes are lower abroad, firms not only have an incentive to keep 
foreign profits abroad but also to invest domestic profits abroad. 
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macroeconomic factors that could affect the relation between corporate profits and economic 
growth. To control for the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, we include Crisis, a dummy 
equal to 1 from Q4:2007 to Q1:2009, and 0 otherwise. Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2014) finds 
that interest rates and default spreads are predictive of next-quarter investments. Therefore, we 
control for the effects of aggregate interest rates and changes in default risk by including three 
proxies: Term, the quarterly difference between returns on 10-year and 1-year Treasuries; DEF, 
the quarterly default spread; and T-note, the quarterly yield on the 10-year Treasury note. Ret, 
quarterly value-weighted stock returns, controls for the impact of the corporate environment. 
Recession is an indicator equal to 1 if the U.S. economy was in a recession during the quarter, as 
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research, and 0 otherwise, and is included to control 
for financial downturns.  
Increased international trade can have an impact on how income is distributed (Giovannoni, 
Lu, Nguyen, and Xu 2014). As international trade increases in an economy, corporate decisions 
about how to distribute income and where to invest may be effected, regardless of the tax 
environment. To control for the effects of globalization, we follow Krugman (2008) in calculating 
quarterly Openness of the United States to international trade as the sum of aggregate imports and 
exports, scaled by GDP. Tech is the ratio of quarterly INV to GDP and is used as a proxy for 
technological changes in the economy (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel 1997) that could 
influence how and where firms choose to invest. Following Guscina (2006), we measure economy-
wide productivity change (Productivity) as the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ quarterly measure of 
output per hour for all non-farm businesses. We include this variable to control for how the shifting 
role of labor in the U.S. economy could impact domestic economic growth. FX is the weighted 
average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against a broad index of currencies that 
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circulate widely, and is meant to control for the impact of currency fluctuations. Foreign 
investment opportunities available to U.S. firms have increased over time, and Nessa, Wilson, and 
Shevlin (2015) report that investors value foreign earnings based on future investment 
opportunities available to firms. Accordingly, Inv_opp is a proxy for investment opportunities 
abroad and is the average of the quarter-over-quarter average GDP growth rates for all OECD 
countries except the United States. Finally, we include Ineq, the percentage of total U.S. income 
going to the wealthiest 1% of residents, to control for the impact of rising inequality on the 
economy as a whole. 
Table 2 provides evidence on the relation between one-quarter-ahead economic growth and 
contemporaneous corporate profits growth. In Panel A (B), economic activity is measured using 
GNP (GDP). The coefficient on CPN in Panel A, Column 1, is a statistically significant 0.03, 
suggesting that, on average, growth in corporate profits and growth in the economy are positively 
associated during our sample period. In Columns 2 through 5, we examine and compare the change 
in this relation using Tax_diff, which captures the difference in the U.S. tax rate and the OECD 
rate. In Column 2 of Panel A, the coefficient on CPN is 0.05 and statistically significant. However, 
as the difference between the corporate tax rate in the United States and the average OECD rate 
increases, the positive association between economic and corporate profit growth declines 
significantly. The coefficient on the interaction of Tax_diff and CPN is -0.31 and statistically 
significant.  
This decline is economically significant as well.	To estimate the economic significance, 
we use an indicator classification for the tax regime, which facilitates interpretation of the 
regression coefficients. The results of this analysis are reported in Panel A of Table A1 in the 
Appendix. The tax regime indicator variable, TaxDum, equals 1 when the difference between the 
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U.S. tax rate and the average OECD rate is above the median difference of 2.60%, and 0 otherwise. 
We find that, when the tax rate difference is below its time-series median (i.e., TaxDum = 0), a 
1% increase in the growth of corporate profits is associated with 0.06% increase in one-quarter 
ahead economic growth. When the tax rate difference is above its time-series median (i.e., TaxDum 
= 1), a 1% increase in corporate profits growth only contributes 0.01% to one-quarter ahead 
economic growth. The above documented pattern is robust to controlling for the other 
macroeconomic factors listed above (see Columns 3-5).  
In Panel B of Table 2, we use GDP as the dependent variable and corporate profits are 
defined as domestic corporate profits. Consistent with the results of Panel A, the evidence in Panel 
B suggest that the relation between corporate profit growth and economic growth is altered based 
on the U.S.-OECD tax differential. In all models, the growth in domestic corporate profits is 
positively associated with growth in GDP. However, when we interact Tax_diff with CPD, the 
association between the interaction term and GDP is negative and significant in all columns  
In summary, the evidence in Table 2 suggests that the difference between the corporate tax 
rate in the United States and the average OECD corporate tax rate changes the relation between 
U.S. corporate profit growth and economic growth. As the U.S. tax rate increases relative to the 
OECD rate, fewer corporate profits are translating into overall economic growth. Further, the 
evidence is suggestive of the relatively higher U.S. tax rate deterring future investments and 
repatriations in amounts significant enough to have macroeconomic consequences and that this 
effect dominates the wealth effects channel.18  
																																								 																				
18 To ensure that our results are not driven solely by the influence of the AJCA, in untabulated analysis, we repeat 
all of our main tests excluding Q4:2004 to Q4:2005. Our results are robust to the exclusion of this period.	
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3.3. Corporate profits and domestic investments  
In this section, we attempt to determine an underlying channel through which the relatively 
higher U.S. tax rate has contributed to the disconnect between economic growth and corporate 
profit growth. We conjecture and test whether U.S. companies direct fewer profits towards 
subsequent domestic investments as the U.S. tax rate increases relative to OECD tax rate.19 To test 
this conjecture, we estimate regressions nested in the following equation:  
INVt+1 = α + δ1CPDt + δ2Tax_difft + δ3Tax_difft*CPDt + δ4Crisist + δ5INVt + δ6GDPt + δ7Termt + 
δ8DEFt + δ9T-notet + δ10Rett + δ11Recession + δ11Opennesst + δ12Techt + δ13Productivityt + δ14FXt 
+ δ15Inv_oppt + δ16Ineqt + εt+1,       (3) 
where INV is the quarterly percentage growth in seasonally adjusted aggregate U.S. domestic 
investments. All other variables are defined as above. 
The results of estimating Equation (3) are reported in Table 3. Similar to the relation 
between economic growth and corporate profit growth, during the full sample period growth in 
corporate profits is positively associated with growth in domestic investments: the coefficient on 
CPD is positive and statistically significant in all specifications. In Column 2, the coefficient on 
the interaction between Tax_diff and CPD is a negative 1.70 and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the association between growth in domestic corporate profits and one-quarter 
ahead domestic investment growth is less positive when the U.S. tax rate is relatively higher in 
comparison to that of the OECD countries.  
The decline in the relation between growth in domestic profits and one-quarter-ahead 
investments is economically significant as well. As before, we classify the tax regime using an 
																																								 																				
19 Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2014) and Arif and Lee (2014) investigate the relation between investments and 
subsequent economic growth, while we focus on the relation between corporate profit growth and one-quarter-ahead 
growth in aggregate investments, which are included in the calculation of GDP. 
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indicator variable, TaxDum, that equals 1 (0) when the difference between the US tax rate and the 
OECD rate is above (below) the median to assist in the estimation of the economic significance. 
In Column 2 of Table A2 of the Appendix, the coefficient on CPD is 0.24 and coefficient on the 
interaction of CPD and TaxDum is -0.21. Both are statistically significant. This suggests that a 1% 
increase in the growth of corporate profits is associated with an increase of 0.24% in the growth 
in one-quarter-ahead investments when the difference between the U.S. tax rate and the OECD 
rate is below its time-series median (i.e., TaxDum = 0). When the tax difference is above its time-
series median, a 1% increase in corporate profits growth is associated with a 0.03% increase in 
one-quarter-ahead investment growth. Further, the patterns in the relation between growth in 
corporate profits and one-quarter-ahead investments are robust to controlling for a variety of other 
factors (see Columns 3-5 in Tables 3 and A2).  
Taken together, the evidence in Tables 1, 2, and 3 suggests that an underlying channel for 
the disconnect between corporate profit growth and economic growth is that fewer corporate 
profits are translating into subsequent private domestic investments, a component of GDP, as the 
U.S. tax rate increases relative to the average OECD tax rate.  
3.4. Repatriation and corporate profits 
Having established the influence of the U.S. tax rate on the relations among corporate profit 
growth, economic growth, and growth in investments, we turn our attention to the impact of the 
relatively higher taxes in the United States on the repatriation of foreign earnings. Since U.S. 
multinationals are required to pay incremental taxes when they repatriate foreign profits, the 
incentive to repatriate profits to the United States is reduced when the relative U.S. tax rate is 
higher than that of the country where the profits are earned. Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2011) 
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reports that companies care about minimizing the financial accounting tax expense along with 
avoiding cash taxes paid. Accordingly, we test the effect of the relative disadvantage of the U.S. 
tax regime on repatriations by U.S. multinationals by estimating various regressions nested in the 
following equation:  
REPATt+1 = α + φ1CPNt + φ2Tax_difft + φ3Crisis + φ4GNPt + φ5Termt + φ6DEFt + φ7T-notet + 
φ8Rett + φ9Recession + φ11Opennesst + φ12Techt + φ13Productivityt + φ14FXt + φ15Inv_oppt + 
φ16Ineqt + εt+1,                                                                                                                               (4) 
where REPAT is the percentage of foreign profits repatriated to the United States, and all other 
variables are defined as above. In these regressions, our main variable of interest is Tax_diff, which 
we predict will have a negative coefficient. This analysis is restricted to the years 1982 to 2013 
because the quarterly data on repatriation become available only after 1981. 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation (4). Consistent with our expectations, we 
find that as the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average rate of the OECD 
countries increases, the proportion of corporate profits that are repatriated to the United States 
decreases significantly. In Column 2, the coefficient on Tax_diff is -151.21 and statistically 
significant. Thus, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that the relatively higher U.S. tax rate has led 
to fewer foreign profits being repatriated. The effect of the relatively higher U.S. tax rates on 
repatriations is economically significant as well. In Column 2 of Table A3, using the indicator 
variable TaxDum, we find that repatriations are lower by 16% when the difference between the 
U.S. tax rate and the average OECD rate is above its time-series median. The decrease in 
repatriations is robust to including other potentially correlated macroeconomic factors in our 
models (see Columns 3-5). 
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3.5. Evidence from the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
 In this section, we use the AJCA as a shock to the tax system to better establish the effect 
of the U.S. tax rate on domestic investments and repatriations, underlying mechanisms that are 
contributing to the disconnect between the growth in corporate profits and the growth in the 
economy.  
The AJCA, which granted a one-time dividend received deduction of 85% on foreign 
earnings repatriated between October 2004 to December 2005, as well as a deduction for 
domestically manufactured products, has been used as an exogenous change to establish the effect 
of taxes on firm-level repatriations and investments (Figure 2 shows the impact of the AJCA on 
repatriations). However, the endogenous characteristics of firms that were or were not able to take 
advantage of the AJCA have led to mixed evidence of the relation between the AJCA and firm-
level investment and repatriation decisions. Blouin and Krull (2009) documents that the 
repatriating firms had limited domestic investment opportunities, and these firms increased 
dividends and repurchases significantly during the AJCA period. Dharmapala et al. (2011) finds 
that repatriations did not increase domestic investment, employment, or research and development, 
even for financially constrained firms. Instead, the repatriations were associated with an increase 
in shareholder payouts. Faulkender and Petersen (2012), on the other hand, classifies firms based 
on capital constraints and shows that capital-constrained firms did indeed take advantage of the 
tax reduction under AJCA to finance domestic investments using repatriated foreign earnings. 
Edwards et al. (2015) finds that firms with high levels of trapped cash make less profitable foreign 
acquisition, but the AJCA greatly reduced this effect. Blouin et al. (2014), Ohrn (2014) and Lester 
(2015) investigate the effect of domestic production activities deduction (DPAD) for domestically 
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manufactured products on firms’ payouts and investments.20 These studies find evidence 
suggestive of domestic investment responding positively to the DPAD and smaller and financially 
constrained firms responding more positively to the tax deduction.  
We adopt a different approach and use the temporary reduction in the tax costs of 
repatriating foreign earnings under the AJCA as a shock to investigate the effect of tax rates on 
aggregate domestic investments, aggregate personal consumption expenditures, and repatriations. 
A significant benefit of examining the effect of the AJCA at the aggregate level is that we can 
overcome endogeneity related to firm characteristics. Faulkender and Petersen (2012) points out 
that the endogenous firm-level investment decision affects whether funds are repatriated and how 
they are spent. Observable and unobservable omitted variables can lead to conflicting conclusions 
about the impact of the AJCA. We argue that these firm-level decisions are inconsequential at the 
aggregate level. If companies repatriate their earnings, these funds will flow through the economy 
regardless of how each firm chooses to spend the funds (e.g., by making domestic investments or 
paying dividends). For instance, when repatriations are used to pay dividends, shareholders could 
consume more or reinvest the dividends into the economy. Therefore, whether the funds are 
invested internally or paid out to investors, they will contribute to economic growth.21 
																																								 																				
20 The DPAD provides a 9% deduction, phased in over several years, for domestic producers Initially, the deduction 
is calculated as the lesser of 3% of a taxpayer’s qualified production activities income, 3% of a taxpayer’s taxable 
income, or 50% of W-2 wages paid by the taxpayer for tax years beginning in 2005 and 2006. The deduction increases 
to 6% of qualified income or taxable income for tax years beginning in 2007-2009, and the full 9% from 2010 onward. 
More details of the DPAD can be found at http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com/taxprof/linkdocs/2005-2228-1.pdf   
21 To validate this conjecture, we investigate the time-series relation between aggregate dividends (which account for 
share repurchases and equity issuances) and one-quarter-ahead domestic investments. Appendix Table A4 presents 
the results. Consistent with expectations, we find that aggregate dividends are positively associated with one-quarter-
ahead domestic aggregate investments. 
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We estimate regressions nested in the following equation to examine the effect of an 
exogenous tax rate cut for the repatriation of foreign earnings offered per the AJCA on 
repatriations, investments, consumption, and economic growth:  
DV = α + τ1ACT + τ2Crisis + τ3Termt + τ4DEFt + τ5T-notet + τ6Rett + τ7Recession + τ8Opennesst + 
τ9Techt + τ10Productivityt + τ11FXt + τ12Inv_oppt + τ13Ineqt + τ14CPt + τ15Economic growtht  + εt, 
                                                                                                       (5) 
where ACT, our variable of interest, equals 1 for quarter 2004:Q4 to 2005:Q4, the period during 
which the AJCA allowed U.S. multinationals to repatriate foreign earnings at a reduced tax rate of 
5.25%, and 0 otherwise.22 Our dependent variables are contemporaneous REPAT, and quarter-
ahead INV, Con, GDP and GNP. We predict that the coefficient on ACT will be positive in all 
regressions. All other variables are defined as above.  
 Table 5 presents the results of the effect of the AJCA on our dependent variables. As 
predicted, in Column 1 the coefficient on ACT is 57.75 and statistically significant. This result 
suggests that the provisions of the AJCA resulted in a significant increase in repatriations of 
foreign earnings.  On average, the AJCA was associated with an economically significant increase 
of approximately 58% quarterly repatriations of foreign earnings. For comparison, the quarterly 
average percentage of foreign earnings repatriated by U.S. multinationals was 49%. Column 2 (3) 
presents the results of testing the effect of the AJCA on domestic investments (personal 
consumption growth). On average, the AJCA is associated with an economically and statistically 
significant increase of 1.96% (0.39%) on domestic investments (domestic personal consumption 
																																								 																				
22 Redmiles (2008) reports that a small percentage of U.S. firms reported repatriations in the 2006 tax year. We check 
the robustness of our findings by including 2006:Q1 in the AJCA period. Our inference remain unchanged. 
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growth).23 We find similar results in Columns 4 and 5 for our measures of economic growth.24 The 
coefficient on ACT in Column 4 (5) is 0.67 (0.64) and statistically significant, suggesting that 
during the AJCA period, quarter-ahead growth in GDP (GNP) increased, on average, by 0.67% 
(0.64%). For comparison, the quarterly average growth rate of GDP and GNP is approximately 
1.5% in our full sample period.25   
 In summary, the evidence in this section and the previous section suggests that tax 
incentives have causal effects on domestic investments, as well as repatriations of foreign earnings, 
an underlying channel contributing to the disconnect between the growth in corporate profits and 
growth in the overall economy in the United States.  
4. Additional analyses 
In this section, we perform several analyses to strengthen the identification of mechanisms 
contributing to the disconnect between corporate profits and economic growth. 
4.1. Corporate profits and economic growth in the Japan and United Kingdom 
To further rule out the alternative mechanisms that might be driving our findings, we 
compare the relation between corporate profits and economic growth in the United States to that 
in Japan and the United Kingdom. While the three developed economies are arguably similar, their 
corporate tax regimes have several significant differences. Japan’s corporate tax rate has been 
higher than the OECD average and higher than the U.S. rate for most of the last 20 years.  On the 
																																								 																				
23 Blouin et al. (2014) reports that the joint effect of DPAD and the repatriation tax holiday provided under AJCA 
encouraged domestic manufacturing firms to potentially increase investments. Thus, the observed increase in domestic 
investments in response to AJCA is partially attributable to the DPAD provision of AJCA.  
24 Because the AJCA was structured as a one-time windfall, allowing companies to repatriate foreign profits 
accumulated over prior periods one time, we are unable to directly examine the impact the Act had on the relation 
between corporate profit growth and economic growth. 
25 In addition to examining the effect of the AJCA on one-quarter-ahead economic activity, we also investigate the 
effect on two-quarters-ahead and three-quarters-ahead economic activity. We find that the AJCA is positively 
associated with two-quarters-ahead and three-quarters-ahead economic activity. 
30 
 
other hand, the corporate tax rate in the United Kingdom has been much lower than that in the 
United States during a similar period and has very closely followed the decline in the rate of the 
other OECD countries.  
Further, both Japan and the United Kingdom have recently changed their treatment of the 
foreign earnings of domestic companies. In 2009 (2010), Japan (the United Kingdom) moved from 
a worldwide taxation system — the system used in the United States, where repatriated foreign 
profits are taxed at the domestic rate less taxes paid abroad — to a territorial system, where taxes 
are paid only in the country in which the earnings are generated, eliminating the incremental 
domestic tax upon repatriation of foreign earnings. Therefore, if the higher tax rate in the United 
States and its worldwide taxation system have contributed to the growing disconnect between 
corporate profits and economic growth, we expect that we should not observe such a disconnect 
in the United Kingdom, regardless of the tax treatment of foreign earnings. In Japan, on the other 
hand, we expect the relation between corporate profit growth and economic growth to be similar 
to that in the United States, but we expect the disconnect in this relation to shrink after 2009 when 
Japan moved to a territorial tax regime.26  
Table 6 reports the results of the comparison of the relation between corporate profits and 
economic growth in the United States and those in Japan and the United Kingdom. GDP and 
investment data for Japan are downloaded from the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan. 
Japanese aggregate corporate profits data are retrieved from Nikkei America Inc. The data are 
available on a quarterly basis from 1994 to 2013. GDP, corporate profits, and investment data for 
																																								 																				
26 After the shift to a territorial tax regime, Japan made additional changes to its corporate tax laws that should 
discourage the shifting of corporate profits to other countries. In 2010, Japan reformed its laws on tax havens, requiring 
that passive income of foreign affiliates in tax havens be taxed domestically. In 2012, the country began denying 
deductions for interest paid to related parties when those interest costs exceeded 50% of total income. While it is not 
possible to separate the magnitude of these new rules from that of the shift to a territorial regime, the changes are 
consistent with the goal of the shift to a territorial system and should therefore strengthen our expected results. 
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the U.K. are downloaded from the British Office of National Statistics. The U.K. analysis is 
restricted to the years 1997 to 2013 because the necessary quarterly U.K. data only become 
available from 1997 onwards. All other data on Japan and the U.K. are downloaded from IHS 
Global Insights and the OECD website. See the Appendix for details.   
Consistent with our conjectures, in Japan, where tax rates are relatively higher than the 
OECD average, growth in corporate profits is significantly higher than growth in the overall 
economy. Specifically, from 1994 to 2009, when Japan had a worldwide tax system, the tax rate 
was, on average, more than 11% higher than the average OECD rate. During this period, as shown 
in univariate analysis in Panel A of Table 6, investment and GDP grew at less than 0.2% per 
quarter, while corporate profits grew at 8.5% per quarter. After shifting to a territorial tax system 
(2010-2013), average growth in investments increased significantly to 0.80% (in comparison, 
average growth in investments is 0.15% during the worldwide tax system period). Further, we 
observe a marginal reduction in the disconnect between growth in corporate profits and GDP 
growth after the country moved to a territorial tax system. Panel B of Table 6 provides further 
evidence of this shift using multivariate tests.27 Columns 1 and 2 show that more corporate profits 
translate into subsequent investment after Japan shifts to a territorial tax system, while this relation 
was not significant under a worldwide tax system. The evidence suggests that tax rates affect 
companies’ decisions to invest domestically and that the tax treatment of foreign earnings impacts 
the relation between corporate profit growth and economic growth. 
In contrast, we do not observe higher corporate profit growth relative to economic growth 
in the United Kingdom, where the tax rate is comparable to the average OECD tax rate. 
																																								 																				
27 The control variables used in these tests are similar, but not identical, to those used in the U.S. tests because the 
macroeconomic data for Japan and the United Kingdom are more limited than they are for the United States. In all 
tests, we attempt to mimic the U.S. data as closely as possible.  
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Specifically, as shown in Panel A of Table 6, between 1997 and 2010, the U.K. tax rate was, on 
average, 29.62%, about 0.4% below the average tax rate of the OECD countries. During this 
period, the U.K. economy grew, on average, at about 1.10% each quarter and corporate profits 
experienced quarterly growth of 0.77%. After the move to a territorial tax system in 2011, average 
domestic investment growth (1.61%) increased significantly compared to the worldwide tax 
system period (1997-2010). However, as shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Panel B, Table 6, increases 
in domestic investment are not attributable to how corporate profits translate into subsequent 
domestic investment. Since the U.K. tax rate is comparable to the OECD average rate during the 
entire period sample period, the shift to a territorial tax system should not affect the relation 
between corporate profits and subsequent domestic investments.28  
Overall, the evidence is consistent with our conjecture that relatively higher tax rates, as 
well as the tax treatment of foreign profits, contribute to the disconnect between the growth in 
corporate profits and the growth in the overall economy.  
4.2. Growth in financial assets of “mobile” industries 
 Firms in “mobile” industries (e.g., pharmaceutical and high-tech industries) have large 
amounts of intellectual property and produce goods that are used around the world. Therefore, they 
are better suited to take advantage of the differences in tax rates across jurisdictions. Firms in these 
industries can use strategic transfer pricing, shift actual assets, and take advantage of global R&D 
tax incentives, among other strategies, to move profits to low-tax countries, thereby reducing their 
tax burden (De Simone and Stomberg 2013). Kleinbard (2012) notes that mobile firms are able to 
increase their after-tax returns by deflecting income from high-tax countries to jurisdictions with 
																																								 																				
28 While the U.K. tax rate was marginally below the average OECD rate, it was not below the rates of all OECD 
countries, providing U.K. companies with the incentive to shift and keep profits in certain low-tax countries. 
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low taxes, without significant incremental risk. However, mobile firms cannot repatriate these 
profits to the United States without incurring an increased tax bill. Further, limits on their abilities 
to distribute earnings to shareholders through dividends and buybacks leads to higher holdings of 
cash and marketable securities.29 Firms with high levels of cash trapped abroad have limited 
investment opportunities (Edwards et al. 2015). Therefore, we expect that U.S. mobile industries’ 
financial asset holdings (i.e., cash and marketable securities) will increase more than other 
industries as the OECD tax rate falls since firms in these industries seek profits abroad that remain 
abroad to avoid repatriation taxes. 
 Following De Simone and Stomberg (2013), we classify the SIC three-digit industries 283, 
357, 367, 737, and 738 as mobile. Barth, Beaver, Hand, and Landsman (1999) classify these 
industries as “pharmaceuticals” (283), “computers” (357, 367, and 737), and “services” (738). The 
pharmaceutical and computer industries were responsible for half of all repatriated funds during 
the AJCA tax holiday (U.S. Senate, 2011), further supporting their classification as mobile. 
 Table 7 provides the results of our test of whether mobile industries increase their financial 
asset holdings at a rate greater than the rest of the corporate sector when the U.S. tax rate increases 
relative to the average OECD tax rate. We compare quarterly aggregate financial asset holdings of 
firms in the mobile industries to firms in other industries in quarters when the tax rate difference 
between the United States and OECD countries is above and below the time-series median. 
Aggregate financial asset holdings are measured as cash and short-term marketable securities 
scaled by total assets. All variables are downloaded from the Compustat quarterly file.30 
																																								 																				
29 Several studies (e.g., Foley et al. 2007; Blouin et al. 2014) find evidence on the firm level that multinational 
companies hold large amounts of their unrepatriated foreign earnings in cash.  
30 We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6,000-6,999) from our analyses as financial asset holdings can be an 
important part of these firms’ operating assets and are influenced by regulation. 
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  Financial asset holdings for mobile industries increase much more than those in other 
industries in quarters when the U.S. tax rate increases relative to the OECD rate. Specifically, 
financial assets as a percentage of total assets for mobile industries increase by 77% from 13% to 
23% when the tax rate difference is above the median versus when it is below the median. This 
increase is economically and statistically significant (t-statistic of the difference is 14.73). For non-
mobile industries, while the increase in financial assets as a percentage of total assets (from 6% to 
7%) is also statistically significant (t-statistic of the difference is 6.19), the economic magnitude 
of the increase compared to that the mobile industries is much smaller. The increase in financial 
assets of other industries is only 1%. Importantly, the difference-in-difference for the increases of 
financial holdings of mobile industries and other industries between the two sub-periods is 
economically and statistically significant (100% with a t-statistic of 15.94). 
 In conclusion, the evidence in Table 7 suggests that U.S. firms in industries that are able to 
take advantage of tax rate differences across jurisdictions (i.e., firms in mobile industries) increase 
their holdings of financial assets at a higher rate than other firms when the OECD tax rate is lower 
relative to the U.S. tax rate.  The evidence is consistent with the conjecture that firms are holding 
more financial assets instead of repatriating profits (thereby avoiding repatriation taxes) and 
making fewer investments in the United States when the OECD tax rate is lower than the U.S. tax 
rate. 
5. Conclusion 
Our study systematically investigates the relation between growth in corporate profits and 
overall economic growth. We document that the relation between the growth in corporate profits 
and the growth in the economy in the United States depends on the U.S. corporate income tax rate 
relative to the average rate of all other OECD countries. We find that  when the U.S. tax rate 
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increase in relation to the average OECD rate, the difference between the growth in corporate 
profits and the overall economy also increases.  
The underlying mechanism contributing to the disconnect between the growth in corporate 
profits and the overall economy is fewer corporate profits translating into subsequent domestic 
investments. We find that the relatively higher U.S. tax rate and the tax treatment of foreign 
earnings discourage U.S. firms from investing their earnings domestically and repatriating their 
foreign earnings to the United States. Relatedly, President Donald Trump has recently proposed 
reducing the U.S. corporate income tax rate and enact a deemed repatriation of currently deferred 
foreign earnings of U.S. multinationals at a tax rate of 10% (Cole 2016). Our results provide 
evidence of potential issues with the current system of taxation and suggest that a reduction in the 
U.S. tax rate and the move to a territorial tax system from a worldwide system can better align 
economic growth with growth in corporate profits by encouraging firms to invest domestically and 
repatriate foreign earnings.  
 In addition to the time-series analysis to identify these underlying channels, we exploit the 
tax shock of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which provided a temporary tax reduction 
for repatriating foreign earnings and a deduction for domestically manufactured products, to 
identify the causal effect of the relatively higher U.S. tax costs on aggregate domestic investments, 
personal consumption, repatriations, and overall economic growth. The evidence suggests that 
aggregate investments, personal consumption, and repatriations increased significantly during the 
years when the AJCA reduced the tax cost of repatriating foreign earnings, and economic growth 
was higher in subsequent quarters. Finally, we also conduct cross-sectional and cross-country 
analyses to examine the impact of taxes on the relation between corporate profits and economic 
growth.  
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Variable Appendix: Variable Descriptions by Country 
Variable Definition 
United States  
ACT An indicator equal to 1 for quarters Q4:2004 to Q4:2005, the period 
during which the American Jobs Creation Act allowed companies to 
repatriate foreign earnings at a lower tax rate 
AT Quarterly aggregate total assets of U.S. companies, retrieved from 
Compustat 
Comp 
Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted employee 
compensation, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Con Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted personal 
consumption expenditures, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
CPD 
Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted U.S. 
aggregate domestic corporate profits, which exclude foreign profits of 
U.S. companies and are adjusted for changes in the book value of 
inventory and capital, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
CPN 
Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted U.S. 
aggregate national corporate profits, which include foreign profits of U.S. 
companies and are adjusted for changes in the book value of inventory 
and capital, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Crisis An indicator equal to 1 for quarters Q4:2007 to Q1:2009, and 0 otherwise 
DEF Quarterly default spread, defined as the difference between the yields on 
Aaa and Baa bonds, retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
FX The weighted average  of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar 
against a broad index of currencies that circulate widely, retrieved from 
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
GDP Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted U.S. gross 
domestic product, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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GNP Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent)  in seasonally adjusted U.S. 
gross national product, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Gov Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted 
government spending, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Ineq Percent of total income, including capital gains, earned by the wealthiest 
1% of people in the United States, retrieved from The World Top Income 
Database 
INV Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted U.S. 
aggregate gross private domestic investment, retrieved from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. Private domestic investments includes three 
components: non-residential investment, residential investment, and 
change in inventories. 
Inv_opp Quarter-over-quarter average growth (in percent) in GDP for all OECD 
countries, excluding the United States, retrieved from the OECD website 
Marketable Securities 
(Short) 
Quarterly aggregate cash holdings and short-term marketable securities of 
U.S. companies, retrieved from Compustat 
Openness 
The sum of quarterly imports and exports, scaled by quarterly GDP, 
retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Productivity Quarterly output per hour for all non-farm businesses, retrieved from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Recession An indicator equal to 1 if the U.S. economy was in a recession during the 
quarter, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research, and 0 
otherwise 
REINV Percentage of quarterly foreign earnings by U.S. firms that was reinvested 
abroad, retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
REPAT Percentage of quarterly foreign earnings by U.S. firms that was repatriated 
through dividends and withdrawals, retrieved from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis  
Ret Quarterly value-weighted aggregate stock returns, retrieved from 
Kenneth French’s website 
T-bill Quarterly yield on the 10-year Treasury note, retrieved from CRSP 
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Tax_diff Difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average tax rate of 
OECD countries in that quarter, retrieved from the OECD for years 1981-
2013 and Corporate Taxes in 80 Countries  for 1975-1980 
Tech Quarterly total investment scaled by quarterly GDP, retrieved from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Term Quarterly difference between the returns on 10-year and 1-year 
Treasuries, retrieved from CRSP 
Japan  
CPD Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in Japanese aggregate corporate 
net operating surplus, retrieved from Nikkei America 
FX Average quarterly Japanese-U.S. exchange rate (yen per dollar), retrieved 
from IHS Global Insights 
GDP Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted Japanese 
gross domestic product, retrieved from the Cabinet Office of the 
Government of Japan 
INV Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted Japanese 
domestic investment, retrieved from the Cabinet Office of the 
Government of Japan 
Openness The sum of quarterly imports and exports, scaled by quarterly GDP, 
retrieved from the Cabinet Bureau of the Government of Japan and IHS 
Global Insights 
Ret Quarterly return on the Tokyo Stock Exchange All Shares Index, retrieved 
from the OECD 
T-bill Quarterly yield on the 10-year Japanese government bond, retrieved from 
IHS Global Insights 
Tech Quarterly total investment scaled by quarterly GDP, retrieved from the 
Cabinet Bureau of the Government of Japan 
Term Quarterly difference between the returns on 10-year and 2-year Japanese 
government bonds, retrieved from IHS Global Insights 
Territorial Indicator equal to 1 when Japan taxes profits made abroad under a 
territorial tax system and 0 when profits are taxed under a worldwide 
system 
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United Kingdom  
CP Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in U.K. aggregate corporate net 
operating surplus, retrieved from the Office for National Statistics 
FX Average quarterly U.K.-U.S. exchange rate (pound per dollar), retrieved 
from IHS Global Insights 
GDP Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted U.K. 
gross domestic product, retrieved from the Office for National Statistics 
INV Quarter-over-quarter growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted U.K. 
domestic investment, retrieved from the Office for National Statistics 
Openness The sum of quarterly imports and exports, scaled by quarterly GDP, 
retrieved from the Office for National Statistics and IHS Global Insights 
Ret Quarterly return on the FTSE 100 Index, retrieved from the OECD 
T-bill Quarterly yield on the 10-year U.K. government bond, retrieved from IHS 
Global Insights 
Tech Quarterly total investment scaled by quarterly GDP, retrieved from the 
Office for National Statistics 
Term Quarterly difference between the returns on 10-year and 2-year U.K. 
government bonds, retrieved from IHS Global Insights 
Territorial Indicator equal to 1 when the U.K. taxes profits made abroad under a 
territorial tax system and 0 when profits are taxed under a worldwide 
system 
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Figure 1: Corporate Income Taxes Over Time 
 
Figure 1 plots the corporate tax rate of the United States and the average corporate tax rate for all other OECD 
countries.		
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Figure 2: Percent Foreign Corporate Profits Repatriated Over Time 
 
Figure 2 plots the percent of profits made abroad by U.S. companies that were repatriated to the United States and 
identifies a spike in repatriations during the years of the American Jobs Creation Act. Data on repatriations are 
available only from 1982. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables of interest. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full 
sample of 155 observations, the period during which the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average 
OECD corporate tax rate is below median difference between the two rates (2.60%), and the period in which the 
difference is above median. Variable definitions are in the Variable Appendix. Panel B presents the relation between 
tax changes, corporate profits, and economic growth components. 
Panel A: Tax Differences and Economic Growth Components 
  Mean Std Dev 5 Perc 25 Perc Median 75 Perc 95 perc 
Full Sample (155 quarterly observations)             
Tax_Diff (*100) 4.70 5.46 -4.00 1.61 2.60 10.08 13.72 
GNP 1.53 0.98 0.10 1.10 1.40 2.00 3.10 
GDP 1.54 0.98 0.20 1.10 1.40 2.00 3.20 
CPD 2.46 9.04 -11.79 -2.25 2.38 6.90 14.48 
CPN 2.28 6.21 -7.62 -0.89 2.98 5.69 11.11 
INV 1.55 4.00 -5.30 -0.40 1.50 3.90 8.20 
REPAT  49.07 18.99 28.57 36.06 46.83 57.52 76.97 
REINV 50.93 18.99 23.03 42.48 53.17 63.94 71.43 
Gov 1.59 1.13 -0.14 0.89 1.50 2.20 3.77 
Comp 1.48 0.99 -0.15 0.91 1.53 2.08 3.03 
Con 1.62 0.88 0.48 1.14 1.54 2.11 3.01 
 
US Tax - OECD Tax: Below Median (76 quarters)           
Tax_Diff (*100) 0.35 2.28 -5.41 -0.71 1.61 1.99 2.59 
GNP 1.97 1.04 0.50 1.35 1.80 2.50 3.50 
GDP 1.97 1.03 0.30 1.30 1.80 2.60 3.60 
CPD 2.67 7.89 -10.84 -2.69 2.47 7.79 15.80 
CPN 2.47 5.83 -7.62 -1.13 3.12 6.54 11.43 
INV 1.98 5.83 -7.62 -1.13 3.12 6.54 11.43 
REPAT  58.57 4.61 -6.40 -0.40 1.90 4.55 10.10 
REINV 41.43 12.02 42.79 51.02 57.30 63.69 82.33 
Gov 2.06 12.02 17.67 36.31 42.71 48.98 57.21 
Comp 1.93 1.08 0.63 1.43 2.03 2.53 3.97 
Con 2.08 0.80 0.51 1.40 1.83 2.53 3.27 
 
US Tax - OECD Tax: Above Median (79 quarters)           
Tax_Diff (*100) 8.88 4.23 2.60 3.83 9.27 13.28 13.73 
GNP 1.12 0.69 -0.10 0.80 1.20 1.50 2.10 
GDP 1.13 0.73 -0.20 0.90 1.20 1.50 2.20 
CPD 2.26 10.07 -13.40 -1.32 2.38 6.43 13.23 
CPN 2.11 6.59 -8.50 -0.77 2.83 4.99 11.10 
INV 1.15 3.30 -4.90 -0.40 1.40 3.40 5.20 
REPAT  43.30 20.15 27.31 32.73 39.03 47.59 66.85 
REINV 56.70 20.15 33.15 52.41 60.97 67.27 72.69 
Gov 1.14 0.99 -0.38 0.53 1.11 1.61 2.69 
Comp 1.05 0.98 -0.39 0.53 1.08 1.69 2.48 
Con 1.18 0.66 0.29 0.93 1.22 1.54 2.02 
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Full Sample (155 quarterly observations): Other Controls           
Term 0.51 3.77 -5.05 -2.08 -0.20 3.08 7.55 
DEF 1.13 0.48 0.62 0.80 0.97 1.36 2.15 
T-bill 1.58 1.38 -0.02 0.73 1.43 2.19 3.91 
Ret 3.25 8.56 -12.84 -1.19 4.01 8.97 16.02 
Recession 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Openness 0.22 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.30 
Tech 17.64 1.84 14.16 16.41 17.82 19.11 20.21 
Productivity 76.89 16.39 57.64 62.70 72.57 93.42 105.93 
FX -0.14 3.10 -5.25 -2.80 0.06 1.90 5.07 
Inv_opp 2.53 2.22 -1.40 1.70 3.10 3.90 4.80 
Ineq 15.74 4.41 8.87 11.99 15.49 19.75 22.83 
 
Panel B: Tax Differences, Corporate Profits, and Economic Growth Components 
Dep Var INVt+1   CONSt+1   COMPt+1   GOVt+1 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Intercept 1.38*** 1.57***   1.59*** 1.94***   1.45*** 1.85***   1.53*** 1.83*** 
  (3.72) (3.52)   (8.85) (8.98)   (7.05) (7.93)   (7.31) (6.74) 
CPDt 0.11** 0.23***   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01 
  (2.04) (3.61)   (0.86) (1.39)   (1.48) (0.99)   (1.08) (0.42) 
Tax_difft   -5.98     -7.53***     -8.61***     -6.33** 
    (-0.73)     (-3.19)     (-3.24)     (-2.12) 
Tax_difft*CPDt -1.70***     -0.10     0.05     0.10 
    (-2.97)     (-1.17)     (0.53)     (0.52) 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.13   0.00 0.23   0.01 0.22   0.00 0.08 
Obs 155 155   155 155   155 155   155 155 
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Table 2: Corporate Profits and Economic Growth  
Table 2 reports the results for regressions of corporate profit growth on quarter-ahead economic growth. In Panel A 
(B), economic growth is measure as the quarterly growth, in percent, in seasonally adjusted gross national (domestic) 
product, GNP (GDP), from quarter t to t+1. Growth in corporate profits, CPN (CPD), is measured as the quarterly 
growth, in percent, in national (domestic) corporate profits. Tax_diff*CPN (Tax_diff*CPD) is the interaction between 
Tax_diff, the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average OECD corporate tax rate, and national 
(domestic) corporate profits. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. t-statistics with Newey-West 
correction for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: National corporate profits and quarter-ahead GNP  
 
GNPt+1 = α + β1CPNt + β2Tax_difft + β3Tax_difft*CPNt + β4Crisist + β5GNPt + β6Termt + β7DEFt + β8T-notet + β9Rett 
+ β10Recessiont + β11Opennesst + β12Techt + β13Productivityt + β14FXt + β15Inv_oppt + β16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var GNPt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.48*** 1.78*** 1.76*** 1.18*** 3.03* 
  (8.85) (8.74) (8.98) (5.09) (1.89) 
CPNt 0.03** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.03** 
  (2.09) (2.93) (2.88) (2.19) (2.29) 
Tax_difft   -6.67*** -4.85** -3.17** 5.28 
    (-2.94) (-2.60) (-2.00) (1.48) 
Tax_difft*CPNt -0.31** -0.35** -0.22** -0.19** 
    (-2.16) (-2.44) (-2.30) (-2.00) 
Crisis     -1.59*** -1.14*** -0.73*** 
      (-8.26) (-7.01) (-3.61) 
GNPt       0.34*** 0.02 
        (4.15) (0.15) 
Termt         -0.70 
          (-0.48) 
DEFt         6.59 
          (0.33) 
T-billt         5.34 
          (1.10) 
Rett         0.88 
          (1.07) 
Recessiont         -1.03*** 
          (-2.74) 
opennesst         1.57 
          (0.32) 
Techt         0.04 
          (0.80) 
Productivityt         -0.02 
          (-0.79) 
FXt         -0.01 
          (-0.51) 
Inv_oppt         0.04** 
          (2.14) 
Ineqt         -0.10*** 
          (-2.72) 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.20 0.28 0.36 0.48 
Obs 155 155 155 155 155 
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Table 2. Continued. 
 
Panel B: Domestic corporate profits and quarter-ahead GDP 
 
GDPt+1 = α + γ1CPDt + γ2Tax_difft + γ3Tax_difft*CPDt + γ4Crisist + γ5GDPt + γ6Termt + γ7DEFt + γ8T-notet + γ9Rett + 
γ10Recessiont + γ11Opennesst + γ12Techt + γ13Productivityt + γ14FXt + γ15Inv_oppt + γ16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var GDPt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.49*** 1.80*** 1.78*** 1.19*** 3.33** 
  (8.52) (8.47) (8.67) (4.98) (2.08) 
CPDt 0.02 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.02** 
  (1.64) (3.16) (3.07) (2.25) (2.40) 
Tax_difft   -6.96*** -5.37*** -3.59** 5.63 
    (-2.97) (-2.75) (-2.19) (1.61) 
Tax_difft*CPDt -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.17** -0.16** 
    (-2.78) (-2.76) (-2.05) (-2.18) 
Crisis     -1.45*** -1.02*** -0.63*** 
      (-7.69) (-6.83) (-3.45) 
GDPt       0.34*** 0.01 
        (4.26) (0.10) 
Termt         -0.81 
          (-0.57) 
DEFt         2.69 
          (0.14) 
T-billt         6.39 
          (1.16) 
Rett         0.57 
          (0.82) 
Recessiont         -1.05*** 
          (-2.82) 
opennesst         2.32 
          (0.46) 
Techt         0.03 
          (0.67) 
Productivityt         -0.02 
          (-1.17) 
FXt         -0.01 
          (-0.49) 
Inv_oppt         0.04** 
          (2.41) 
Ineqt         -0.09** 
          (-2.29) 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.49 
Obs 155 155 155 155 155 
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Table 3: Corporate Profits and Quarter-Ahead Investments  
Table 3 presents the results for regressions of corporate profit growth on quarter-ahead growth, in percent, in domestic 
investment. Growth in investment (INV) is measured as the quarterly growth, in percent, in seasonally adjusted gross 
private domestic investment from quarter t to t+1. Growth in corporate profits (CPD) is measured as the quarterly 
growth, in percent, in domestic corporate profits from quarter t-1 to t. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
INVt+1 = α + δ1CPDt + δ2Tax_difft + δ3Tax_difft*CPDt + δ4Crisist + δ5INVt + δ6GDPt + δ7Termt + δ8DEFt + δ9T-notet 
+ δ10Rett + δ11Recession + δ11Opennesst + δ12Techt + δ13Productivityt + δ14FXt + δ15Inv_oppt + δ16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var INVt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.38*** 1.57*** 1.48*** 1.18*** 26.77*** 
  (3.72) (3.52) (3.77) (3.74) (5.34) 
CPDt 0.11** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 
  (2.04) (3.61) (3.53) (3.82) (2.68) 
Tax_difft   -5.98 2.13 1.77 42.69*** 
    (-0.73) (0.47) (0.45) (4.44) 
Tax_difft*CPDt -1.70*** -1.67*** -1.47*** -0.74** 
    (-2.97) (-3.07) (-3.05) (-2.30) 
Crisis     -7.43*** -6.18*** -2.58*** 
      (-6.34) (-5.62) (-3.45) 
Invt       0.19*** -0.28*** 
        (2.69) (-2.86) 
GDPt         1.48** 
          (2.53) 
Termt         -9.32 
          (-1.41) 
DEFt         -183.06** 
          (-2.52) 
T-billt         59.25*** 
          (2.90) 
Rett         -2.10 
          (-0.73) 
Recessiont         -4.43*** 
          (-3.32) 
opennesst         -22.17 
          (-0.98) 
Techt         -0.90*** 
          (-4.70) 
Productivityt         -0.10 
          (-1.03) 
FXt         0.10 
          (1.51) 
Inv_oppt         0.11 
          (1.21) 
Ineqt         0.03 
          (0.20) 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.28 0.50 
Obs 155 155 155 155 155 
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Table 4: Repatriation of Corporate Profits  
Table 4 presents the results of the effect of relative U.S. tax rates on the percentage of quarterly foreign profits earned 
by U.S. companies that are repatriated. Percentage of foreign profits repatriated (REPAT) is for quarter t+1. Data on 
repatriations are available only from 1982, hence the analysis period is 1982-2013. Growth in corporate profits (CPN) 
is measured as the quarterly growth, in percent, in national corporate profits from quarter t-1 to t.  See the Variable 
Appendix for variable descriptions. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
REPATt+1 = α + φ1CPNt + γ2Tax_difft + γ3Crisis + γ4GNPt + γ5Termt + γ6DEFt + γ7T-notet + γ8Rett + γ9Recession + 
γ11Opennesst + γ12Techt + γ13Productivityt + γ14FXt + γ15Inv_oppt + γ16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var % Repatriationt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 49.42*** 57.58*** 57.64*** 57.76*** 67.25*** 
  (14.56) (41.38) (42.79) (12.63) (2.63) 
CPNt -0.28** -0.26** -0.24** -0.24** -0.16** 
  (-2.18) (-2.16) (-2.01) (-2.10) (-2.11) 
Tax_difft   -151.21*** -158.04*** -158.32*** -109.81** 
    (-5.00) (-4.59) (-3.84) (-2.50) 
Crisis     6.16 6.06 0.44 
      (1.30) (1.51) (0.07) 
GNPt       -0.08 -0.05 
        (-0.03) (-0.02) 
Termt         97.37* 
          (1.82) 
DEFt         284.84 
          (1.09) 
T-billt         -216.48 
          (-0.97) 
Rett         -0.31 
          (-0.03) 
Recessiont         6.94 
          (0.94) 
opennesst         -91.14 
          (-0.55) 
Techt         0.35 
          (0.30) 
Productivityt         -0.30 
          (-0.57) 
FXt         0.50 
          (0.67) 
Inv_oppt         0.93** 
          (2.29) 
Ineqt         1.34 
          (1.02) 
Adj. R2 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 
Obs 128 128 128 128 128 
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Table 5: American Jobs Creation Act and Investments  
Table 5 examines the effect of the AJCA on repatriations of foreign profits by U.S. multinationals, domestic 
investments, domestic personal consumption expenditures, and economic growth.  Percentage of foreign profits 
repatriated (PCT_Repatriation) is for quarter t. Growth in investment (INV) is measured as the quarterly growth, in 
percent, in seasonally adjusted gross private domestic investment from quarter t to t+1. Growth in personal 
consumption (Con) is measured as the quarterly growth, in percent, in seasonally adjusted personal consumption 
expenditures from quarter t to t+1. Economic growth (GDP (GNP)) is measured as the quarterly growth, in percent, 
in seasonally adjusted gross domestic product (gross national product) from quarter t to t+1. ACT equals 1 for quarters 
Q4:2004 to Q4:2005, when U.S. multinational firms were allowed to repatriate foreign earnings at a lower tax rate. 
See the Variable Appendix for variable descriptions. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
DV = α + τ1ACT + τ2Crisis + τ3Termt + τ4DEFt + τ5T-notet + τ6Rett + τ7Recession + τ8Opennesst + τ9Techt + 
τ10Productivityt + τ11FXt + τ12Inv_oppt + τ13Ineqt + τ14CPt + τ15Economic growtht  + εt 
Dep Var PCT_Repatriationt   INVt+1   Cont+1   GDPt+1   GNPt+1 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Intercept 164.38***   10.72*   1.33   1.88   1.70 
  (11.08)   (1.89)   (1.39)   (1.60)   (1.44) 
Act 57.75***   1.96***   0.39**   0.67***   0.64*** 
  (4.08)   (2.78)   (2.41)   (3.88)   (3.70) 
Crisist 1.64   -1.93**   -0.85***   -0.50**   -0.60** 
  (0.41)   (-2.26)   (-3.22)   (-2.24)   (-2.55) 
Termt -41.23   -9.75   0.10   -1.29   -1.17 
  (-1.40)   (-1.32)   (0.07)   (-0.94)   (-0.86) 
DEFt 697.72***   -95.72   36.77**   12.03   15.62 
  (3.11)   (-1.33)   (2.54)   (0.67)   (0.86) 
T-billt 194.11   84.54***   -2.68   8.12   6.76 
  (1.08)   (4.20)   (-0.53)   (1.46)   (1.37) 
Rett -19.16**   0.21   1.11**   0.86   1.11 
  (-2.36)   (0.07)   (2.46)   (1.27)   (1.42) 
Recessiont -3.21   -4.08***   -0.72**   -1.08***   -1.06*** 
  (-0.57)   (-3.04)   (-2.18)   (-2.85)   (-2.80) 
opennesst 26.57   -16.32   2.79   3.66   2.83 
  (0.36)   (-0.84)   (0.82)   (0.80)   (0.66) 
Techt -3.78***   -0.56**   0.09**   0.04   0.04 
  (-4.49)   (-2.31)   (2.16)   (0.73)   (0.85) 
Productivityt -1.50***   0.09   -0.01   0.00   0.00 
  (-6.07)   (1.36)   (-0.95)   (-0.17)   (0.25) 
FXt 0.14   0.09   -0.03*   -0.01   -0.01 
  (0.37)   (1.45)   (-1.87)   (-0.43)   (-0.51) 
Inv_oppt 1.05***   0.05   0.03*   0.04**   0.03* 
  (2.84)   (0.46)   (1.74)   (2.11)   (1.90) 
Ineqt 3.22***   -0.22   -0.10**   -0.13***   -0.13*** 
  (3.20)   (-1.51)   (-2.05)   (-2.85)   (-3.17) 
CPNt 0.10               0.01 
  (0.52)               (1.54) 
GNPt -2.57               0.03 
  (-1.57)               (0.34) 
CPDt     0.06*   0.00   0.01*     
      (1.78)   (0.36)   (1.66)     
GDPt     0.80*   -0.01   0.04     
      (1.84)   (-0.06)   (0.38)     
Adj. R2 0.49   0.44   0.52   0.49   0.46 
Obs 128   155   155   155   155 
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Table 6: Comparison of Corporate Profits and Economic Growth: Japan and the United 
Kingdom versus United States  
Table 6 compares the relation between corporate profit growth and economic growth in United States and two 
economies with different tax structures, Japan and the United Kingdom, which shifted from a worldwide taxation 
system to a territorial system in 2010 (2011) for Japan (the United Kingdom). Panel A provides descriptive evidence. 
Growth in investment (INV) is measured as the quarterly growth, in percent, in seasonally adjusted gross private 
domestic investment from quarter t-1 to t. Growth in corporate profits (CP) is measured as the quarterly growth, in 
percent, in corporate profits, which includes foreign profits earned abroad. Economic growth (GDP) is measure as the 
quarterly growth (in percent) in seasonally adjusted gross domestic product from quarter t-1 to t. Tax rate is the average 
tax rate for the country during the sample period. Tax rate-OECD is the difference between the country tax rate and 
the average OECD tax rate during the period. Panel B presents the results for regressions of corporate profit growth 
on quarter-ahead percent growth (in percent) in domestic investment in Japan. Territorial is an indicator equal to 1 
during the period when Japan taxed foreign profits under a territorial tax system (2010-2013) and 0 otherwise. All 
other variable are defined as above. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Evidence 
 
Japan        
INV CP GDP Sample  Tax rate Tax rate-OECD Tax system 
0.15 8.52 0.18 1994-2009  42.99% 11.38% Worldwide 
0.80 5.55 0.38 2010-2013  38.91% 13.40% Territorial 
0.28 7.92 0.22 1994-2013  42.17% 11.79%  
        
United Kingdom       
INV CP GDP Sample  Tax rate Tax rate-OECD Tax system  
0.65 0.77 1.10 1997-2010  29.62% -0.36% Worldwide  
1.61 1.03 0.87 2011-2013  24.33% -1.12% Territorial  
0.85 0.85 1.07 1997-2013  28.76% -0.49%   
         
United States       
INV CP GDP Sample  Tax rate Tax rate-OECD Tax system  
1.15 2.57 1.12 1994-2013  39.32% 8.94% Worldwide  
0.98 1.97 1.07 1997-2013  39.27% 10.02% Worldwide  
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Table 6. Continued. 
 
Panel B: Territorial Tax System and Domestic Investments 
 
Dep Var INVt+1 
  Japan   UK 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.13 13.11   0.52 9.88 
  (0.34) (1.02)   (1.53) (1.03) 
CPt 0.00 0.00   0.02 0.03 
  (0.18) (-0.08)   (0.20) (0.29) 
Territorialt 0.60 0.73   1.38*** 6.15*** 
  (1.15) (0.36)   (2.86) (5.79) 
CPt*Territorialt 0.03** 0.02*   -0.04 -0.28 
  (2.38) (1.88)   (-0.40) (-1.53) 
Invt   -0.13     -0.16 
    (-0.81)     (-0.85) 
Termt   1.64     -2.47 
    (1.10)     (-1.03) 
T-billt   0.56     3.98* 
    (1.52)     (1.69) 
Rett   0.07**     0.07* 
    (2.43)     (1.71) 
opennesst   5.36     -0.58** 
    (1.58)     (-2.22) 
Techt   -17.43**     -1.07** 
    (-2.64)     (-2.65) 
FXt   0.04     0.20 
    (0.83)     (0.02) 
Adj. R2 0.00 0.10   0.00 0.01 
Obs 78 78   66 66 
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Table 7: Financial Assets in Mobile Industry 
Table 7 examines the change in the financial asset holdings of mobile industries and other industries. Column 1 
examines the period during which the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average OECD corporate 
tax rate is below the median difference between the two rates (2.60%). Column 2 examines the period during which 
the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average OECD corporate tax rate is above the median 
difference between the two rates (2.60%). Marketable Securities (Short) is quarterly cash and short-term marketable 
securities. AT is total assets. Industries are defined by three-digit SIC code for all firms in Compustat. Mobile 
industries are those with three-digit SIC codes 283, 357, 367, 737, and 738 (De Simone and Stomberg, 2013). t-
statistics in the last column measure the difference between financial assets before and after the tax change. t-statistics 
in the last row measure the difference between mobile and other industries in the same period. *** indicates 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
  Marketable Securities (Short)/AT   
  
US Tax - OECD Tax: 
Below Median (76 
quarters) 
US Tax - OECD Tax: 
Above Median (79 
quarters)   
      (1) (2) 
t-statistic (difference between 
columns (1) and (2)) 
Mobile industries 0.13 0.23 14.73*** 
 
Other industries 0.06 0.07 6.19*** 
    
Difference between 
mobile and other 
industries 0.08*** 0.16*** 
 
0.08*** 
      (32.74)                 (39.12)                     (15.94)  
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Table A1: Corporate Profits and Economic Growth  
Table A1 reports the results for regressions of corporate profit growth on quarter-ahead economic growth. In Panel A 
(B), economic growth is measure as the quarterly growth, in percent, in seasonally adjusted gross national (domestic) 
product, GNP (GDP), from quarter t to t+1. Growth in corporate profits, CPN (CPD), is measured as the quarterly 
growth, in percent, in national (domestic) corporate profits. Taxdum is an indicator variable equal to 1 during periods 
in which the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average OECD corporate tax rate is above the 
median (2.60%). Taxdum*CPN (Taxdum*CPD) is the interaction between Taxdum and national (domestic) corporate 
profits. Variable definitions are in the Variable Appendix. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: National corporate profits and quarter-ahead GNP  
 
GNPt+1 = α + β1CPNt + β2Taxdumt + β3Taxdumt*CPNt + β4Crisist + β5GNPt + β6Termt + β7DEFt + β8T-notet + β9Rett 
+ β10Recessiont + β11Opennesst + β12Techt + β13Productivityt + β14FXt + β15Inv_oppt + β16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var GNPt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.48*** 1.84*** 1.84*** 1.34*** 1.42 
  (8.85) (8.81) (8.78) (4.73) (1.10) 
CPNt 0.03** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.04*** 
  (2.09) (4.13) (4.11) (2.34) (3.01) 
TaxDumt   -0.72*** -0.58** -0.43** 0.25 
    (-2.73) (-2.56) (-2.08) (1.07) 
TaxDumt*CPNt   -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.04*** 
    (-3.03) (-3.58) (-2.35) (-3.13) 
Crisis     -1.73*** -1.31*** -0.71*** 
      (-9.46) (-6.68) (-3.54) 
GNPt       0.28*** 0.00 
        (3.13) (0.03) 
Termt         -0.48 
          (-0.39) 
DEFt         15.79 
          (0.89) 
T-billt         6.26 
          (1.28) 
Rett         1.00 
          (1.21) 
Recessiont         -1.04*** 
          (-2.84) 
opennesst         0.05 
          (0.01) 
Techt         0.07 
          (1.24) 
Productivityt         0.01 
          (0.72) 
FXt         -0.01 
          (-0.49) 
Inv_oppt         0.03* 
          (1.91) 
Ineqt         -0.15*** 
          (-3.42) 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.23 0.34 0.38 0.49 
Obs 155 155 155 155 155 
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Table A1. Continued. 
 
Panel B: Domestic corporate profits and quarter-ahead GDP 
 
GDPt+1 = α + γ1CPDt + γ2Taxdumt + γ3Taxdumt*CPDt + γ4Crisist + γ5GDPt + γ6Termt + γ7DEFt + γ8T-notet + γ9Rett + 
γ10Recessiont + γ11Opennesst + γ12Techt + γ13Productivityt + γ14FXt + γ15Inv_oppt + γ16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var GDPt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.49*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.33*** 1.52 
  (8.52) (8.65) (8.62) (4.68) (1.17) 
CPDt 0.02 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.03*** 
  (1.64) (3.47) (3.46) (2.04) (3.21) 
Taxdumt   -0.76*** -0.64*** -0.46** 0.21 
    (-2.83) (-2.71) (-2.22) (0.88) 
TaxDumt*CPDt   -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02* -0.03*** 
    (-2.98) (-3.14) (-1.76) (-3.20) 
Crisis     -1.62*** -1.19*** -0.58*** 
      (-9.03) (-6.46) (-3.07) 
GDPt       0.30*** -0.01 
        (3.36) (-0.07) 
Termt         -0.69 
          (-0.56) 
DEFt         12.71 
          (0.72) 
T-billt         7.12 
          (1.28) 
Rett         0.77 
          (1.07) 
Recessiont         -1.07*** 
          (-2.98) 
opennesst         0.78 
          (0.17) 
Techt         0.07 
          (1.24) 
Productivityt         0.01 
          (0.46) 
FXt         -0.01 
          (-0.38) 
Inv_oppt         0.04** 
          (2.25) 
Ineqt         -0.14*** 
          (-3.05) 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.24 0.33 0.39 0.49 
Obs 155 155 155 155 155 
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Table A2: Corporate Profits and Quarter-Ahead Investments  
Table A2 presents the results for regressions of corporate profit growth on quarter-ahead percent growth, in percent, 
in domestic investment. Growth in investment (INV) is measured as the quarterly growth, in percent, in seasonally 
adjusted gross private domestic investment from quarter t to t+1. Growth in corporate profits (CPD) is measured as 
the quarterly growth, in percent, in domestic corporate profits from quarter t-1 to t. Taxdum is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 during periods in which the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average OECD corporate 
tax rate is above the median (2.60%). Taxdum*CPD is the interaction between Taxdum and domestic corporate profits.  
Variable definitions are in the Variable Appendix. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
INVt+1 = α + δ1CPDt + δ2Taxdumt + δ3Taxdumt*CPDt + δ4Crisist + δ5INVt + δ6GDPt + δ7Termt + δ8DEFt + δ9T-notet + 
δ10Rett + δ11Recession + δ11Opennesst + δ12Techt + δ13Productivityt + δ14FXt + δ15Inv_oppt + δ16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var INVt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.38*** 1.56*** 1.56*** 1.29*** 15.14*** 
  (3.72) (3.13) (3.12) (3.17) (3.41) 
CPDt 0.11** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.12*** 
  (2.04) (3.89) (3.87) (3.89) (2.65) 
TaxDumt   -0.52 0.04 0.02 2.36** 
    (-0.69) (0.07) (0.04) (2.38) 
TaxDumt*CPDt   -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.12*** 
    (-3.09) (-3.28) (-3.08) (-2.92) 
Crisis     -7.37*** -6.23*** -2.01** 
      (-6.64) (-5.70) (-2.34) 
Invt       0.18** -0.26*** 
        (2.31) (-2.66) 
GDPt         1.46** 
          (2.49) 
Termt         -8.15 
          (-1.41) 
DEFt         -82.87 
          (-1.04) 
T-billt         68.32*** 
          (3.19) 
Rett         -0.56 
          (-0.19) 
Recessiont         -4.47*** 
          (-3.50) 
opennesst         -32.37* 
          (-1.66) 
Techt         -0.69*** 
          (-3.56) 
Productivityt         0.10* 
          (1.74) 
FXt         0.12 
          (1.64) 
Inv_oppt         0.12 
          (1.44) 
Ineqt         -0.31** 
          (-2.03) 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.48 
Obs 155 155 155 155 155 
 
 
60 
 
Table A3: Repatriation of Corporate Profits  
Table A3 presents the results of the effect of relative U.S. tax rates on the percentage of quarterly foreign profits 
earned by U.S. companies that are repatriated. Percentage of foreign profits repatriated (REPAT) is measured in 
quarter t+1. Growth in corporate profits (CPN) is measured as the quarterly growth, in percent, in national corporate 
profits from quarter t-1 to t. TaxDum is an indicator variable equal to 1 during periods in which the difference between 
the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average OECD corporate tax rate is above median (2.60%). Variable definitions 
are in the Variable Appendix. t-statistics with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
REPATt+1 = α + φ1CPNt + φ2Taxdumt + φ3Crisis + φ4GNPt + φ5Termt + φ6DEFt + φ7T-billt + φ8Rett + φ9Recession + 
φ11Opennesst + φ12Techt + φ13Productivityt + φ14FXt + φ15Inv_oppt + φ16Ineqt + εt+1 
Dep Var % Repatriationt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 49.42*** 60.32*** 60.33*** 58.70*** 105.83*** 
  (16.57) (23.90) (23.81) (13.94) (3.19) 
CPNt -0.28* -0.23** -0.24** -0.26*** -0.08 
  (-1.91) (-2.32) (-2.34) (-2.70) (-0.69) 
TaxDumt   -16.17*** -16.09*** -15.72*** -11.34* 
    (-4.10) (-3.90) (-3.71) (-1.71) 
Crisis     -1.19 0.32 0.11 
      (-0.34) (0.07) (0.02) 
GNPt       1.03 -0.82 
        (0.39) (-0.34) 
Termt         110.92* 
          (1.73) 
DEFt         -344.27 
          (-0.73) 
T-billt         -340.31 
          (-1.30) 
Rett         -6.20 
          (-0.56) 
Recessiont         8.09 
          (1.00) 
Opennesst         -93.35 
          (-0.52) 
Techt         -0.03 
          (-0.02) 
Productivityt         -0.69 
          (-1.22) 
FXt         0.59 
          (0.74) 
Inv_oppt         0.54 
          (0.76) 
Ineqt         2.06 
          (1.62) 
Adj. R2 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.20 
Obs 128 128 128 128 128 
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Table A4: Aggregate Stock Returns, Dividends, and Subsequent Economic Growth 
Table A4 presents evidence of the relation between the aggregate wealth effect (measured using aggregate quarterly 
stock returns and aggregate dividends) and one quarter-ahead GDP and personal consumption expenditures. Agg_ret 
is the aggregate quarterly stock returns. Agg_Div is the aggregate quarterly dividends measured using the definitions 
in Boudoukh et al. (2007). All other variable definitions are in the Variable Appendix. t-statistics with Newey-West 
correction for autocorrelation are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
DVt+1 = α + φ1Agg_Rett + φ2Agg_Divt + φ3Termt + φ4DEFt + φ5One_yr_rett + εt+1 
Dep Var GDPt+1 Cont+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.41*** 3.44*** 1.30*** 2.75*** 
 (6.38) (3.27) (7.15) (3.26) 
Agg_Rett 2.60**  3.01***  
 (2.26)  (2.78)  
Agg_Divt  0.79**  0.55* 
  (2.13)  (1.81) 
Termt -6.28*** -5.53** -6.54*** -5.76*** 
 (-2.63) (-2.09) (-4.12) (-2.97) 
DEFt -21.35 -37.59 -3.27 -14.09 
 (-0.84) (-1.37) (-0.12) (-0.48) 
One_yr_rt 21.66*** 21.05** 19.55** 19.70* 
 (2.72) (2.21) (2.35) (1.98) 
     
Adj. R2 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.09 
Obs 143 143 143 143 
	
 
